TY - JOUR
T1 - Tactical distribution in local funding
T2 - The value of an aligned mayor
AU - Lara E., Bernardo
AU - Toro M., Sergio
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2019/1
Y1 - 2019/1
N2 - Using Chile as a case study for understanding tactical distribution under extensive controls on expenditure, this paper examines whether political motives affect the allocation of funds from the central government to localities. Collecting local-level data of two infrastructure funding programs and using the voting gap percentage between the coalition candidate and opposition competitors in a Sharp Regression Discontinuity methodology, we find causal evidence in favor of three hypotheses: (i) a coalition criterion influences the funding allocation to the local level; (ii) an electoral cycle exists in local funding; and (iii) the degree of coalition targeting varies based on a locality's history of coalition alignment. In sum, the central government regards politically aligned mayors as valuable electoral assets, especially in municipalities historically aligned with the coalition.
AB - Using Chile as a case study for understanding tactical distribution under extensive controls on expenditure, this paper examines whether political motives affect the allocation of funds from the central government to localities. Collecting local-level data of two infrastructure funding programs and using the voting gap percentage between the coalition candidate and opposition competitors in a Sharp Regression Discontinuity methodology, we find causal evidence in favor of three hypotheses: (i) a coalition criterion influences the funding allocation to the local level; (ii) an electoral cycle exists in local funding; and (iii) the degree of coalition targeting varies based on a locality's history of coalition alignment. In sum, the central government regards politically aligned mayors as valuable electoral assets, especially in municipalities historically aligned with the coalition.
KW - Alignment
KW - Expenditure controls
KW - Fiscal federalism
KW - Tactical distribution
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85051077146&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.07.006
DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.07.006
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85051077146
SN - 0176-2680
VL - 56
SP - 74
EP - 89
JO - European Journal of Political Economy
JF - European Journal of Political Economy
ER -