El deber procreativo de Jonas y el problema de la no-identidad

In his ethics of responsibility, Jonas argues for a categorical but heteronomous imperative: that humanity should be. According to this, there would be a procreative duty of humanity. This duty would already include the conditions of a genuinely human life. First, the article argues that this imperative is not capable of satisfactorily dealing with the challenge imposed by the problem of non-identity, popularized by Parfit. If the choice between two policies today implies the non-existence of generations in the future, or an existence in bad conditions or even in conditions of an earthly hell, Jonas’ imperative should lead to the choice of the second policy. This is counter-intuitive. Secondly, the article argues that the integration of the interests of future generations into ethics can be done from a Kantian interpretation. Finally, the article holds that the fulfillment of the duty of humanity to be, can lead to violating the autonomy of people in the present in favor of the generation of value in the future.