Defending the “claimability objection” from non-conventional arguments

Producción científica: Contribución a una revistaArtículorevisión exhaustiva


According to the well-known “claimability objection” posed by O’Neill, it is unjustified to hold that each individual has a human right to socioeconomic goods because the duty-bearers are not sufficiently determined. Even though this objection has been defended in the literature from many counter-arguments, at-tacks against the claimability objection based on non-conventional conceptions of human rights remain unexplored. In this paper, I aim to fill this significant gap in the philosophical literature. I defend the claimability objection from arguments that aim to undermine such an objection on the basis of non-conventional conceptions of human rights. By doing so, I reinforce the defence of the claimability objection.

Idioma originalInglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)173-192
Número de páginas20
EstadoPublicada - 21 dic. 2022
Publicado de forma externa


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