Self-selection in the market of teachers

Juan A. Correa, Francisco Parro, Loreto Reyes

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Scopus citations


Public school teachers are usually paid according to centralized earning schedules, in which their income depends mainly on experience. By contrast, in private schools, there is high wage dispersion, and salaries correspond mainly to teachers’ performance. That dichotomous labour regulation encourages teachers with better unobservable skills to self-select into private schools because the likelihood of earning higher wages is higher than in public schools. The other side of the coin is the self-selection of ‘bad’ teachers into public schools. Using a representative sample of Chilean teachers, we estimate a two-sector Roy model to test self-selection. We find evidence of negative self-selection of teachers into public schools.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1331-1349
Number of pages19
JournalApplied Economics
Issue number13
StatePublished - 16 Mar 2015
Externally publishedYes


  • education
  • human capital
  • self-selection


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