Abstract
Non-trope theoretic traditional bare particularism conceives of ordinary concrete particulars as complex wholes constituted by universals and a ‘bare particular’: a proper-tyless, non-repeatable entity which functions as property-bearer and individuator of the ordinary, ‘thick’ particular. Sellars-type objections to traditional bare particularism claim traditional bare particularism to involve the contradictory proposition that bare particulars have no properties and yet exemplify properties. Moreland-style bare particularism is a new version of bare particularism which aims to block Sellars-type objections by distin-guishing between two types of property exemplification and refining thereby the sense in which bare particulars are said to have no properties. In this paper, (i) I present this new strategy for bare particularism, (ii) set out a version of the Sellars-type objection which, it is argued, applies no less to old bare particularism than to Moreland-style bare particular-ism, (iii) elaborate two possible replies to this version, and (iv) show that neither of them is persuasive.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 41-59 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Teorema |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| State | Published - 2020 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Bare Particulars
- Constituent Ontologies
- Property Exemplification (Types of)
- Universals