Propiedad sobre sí mismo, derechos liberales y autonomía: El fundamento kantiano de anarquía, estado y utopía de robert nozick?

In Anarchy, State and Utopia, Robert Nozick holds that moral side-constraints reflects the underlying Kantian's principle that individuals are ends and not merely means. He also points out that these moral side-constraints lead to the libertarian natural rights. In this paper I will analyze the alleged Kantian foundation of Nozick's political philosophy and the conceptual relationship between kantian's conception of dignity and self-ownership principle, which is widely accepted as the last foundation of Nozick's theory of justice. I will conclude that, despite certain similarities, self-ownership and kantian's conception of dignity are conceptually incompatible. Likewise, I will conclude that the concept of self-ownership is a key element in the understanding of Nozick's libertarianism and, therefore, as an exegetic tool of it, it should be preferred over the kantian's concept of dignity.