¿Para qué sirve la historia de la filosofía? A propósito de la teoría de la percepción de John R. Searle

John Searle defends «Direct Realism», which argues that the direct object of perception is the extra-mental reality. According to this theory, there is no intermediary entity between the act of perception and the perceived thing, as a «representation», «resemblance», or «species». Actually, Searle systematically develops a theory of perception which displays the explanatory possibilities of the mentioned thesis. In the present article, we discussed some aspects of the mentioned thesis with the purpose of comparing them with selective medieval thinkers cognitive theories. We intend to show that Searle's theory offers nothing radically new, and that he falls into avoidable mistakes if he had had a better understanding of medieval historiography that cover such issues. Thus, we intend to assert the importance of the History of Philosophy.