This article aims to elucidate the main elements of the critique on the Kantian notion of teleology set out by the young Nietzsche in his unfi nished doctoral thesis project of 1868. It regognises two central focuses of Nietzche's criticism: a theoretical one, focused on the epistemological and ontological problems of the Kantian theory, and a practical one, which looks at the ethical issues that the Kantian doctrine implies. Basically, it tries to show that Nietzsche rejects the concept of purpusiveness (Zweckmässigkeit) because it is a counterfeit form of intellect, unnecessary for synthesizing experience, has a historical and physiological origin, and favors nihilistic and decadent ethics. D. R.
|Translated title of the contribution||Nietzsche and Kantian teleological judgment: Overcoming rational optimism|
|Number of pages||30|
|State||Published - 1 Jan 2017|