Network games with atomic players

Roberto Cominetti, José R. Correa, Nicolás E. Stier-Moses

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

33 Scopus citations


We study network arid congestion games with atomic players that can split their flow. This type of games readily applies to competition among freight companies, telecommunication network service providers, intelligent transportation systems and manufacturing with flexible machines. We analyze the worst-case inefficiency of Nash equilibria in those games and conclude that although self-interested agents will not in general achieve a fully efficient solution, the loss is not too large. We show how to compute several bounds for the worst-case inefficiency, which depend on the characteristics of cost functions and the market structure in the game. In addition, we show examples in which market aggregation can adversely impact the aggregated competitors, even though their market power increases. When the market structure is simple enough, this counter-intuitive phenomenon does not arise.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAutomata, Languages and Programming - 33rd International Colloquium, ICALP 2006, Proceedings
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)3540359044, 9783540359043
StatePublished - 2006
Event33rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP 2006 - Venice, Italy
Duration: 10 Jul 200614 Jul 2006

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume4051 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference33rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP 2006


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