Foreign exchange intervention and inflation targeting: The role of credibility

Gustavo Adler, Ruy Lama, Juan Pablo Medina

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Scopus citations


We develop a small open economy model where the central bank operates under a flexible inflation targeting regime, i.e., monetary policy is aimed at stabilizing output and inflation. In this theoretical framework, we analyze to what extent foreign exchange intervention (FXI) can contribute to the central bank goals for different degrees of credibility. We find two key results. First, in a baseline scenario where the central bank is perfectly credible, FXI can improve macroeconomic outcomes by successfully stabilizing both output and inflation in response to foreign disturbances. Second, when central bank lacks credibility, FXI policies entail a trade-off by reducing output volatility at the expense of inducing higher inflation volatility. In this scenario, FXI policies prevent the central bank from achieving the goal of price stability. These results suggest that FXI is more likely to support an inflation targeting regime when the credibility of the central bank is high.

Original languageEnglish
Article number103716
JournalJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
StatePublished - Sep 2019
Externally publishedYes


  • Foreign exchange intervention
  • Imperfect credibility
  • Inflation targeting
  • Learning
  • Small open economy


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