Defending the “claimability objection” from non-conventional arguments

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According to the well-known “claimability objection” posed by O’Neill, it is unjustified to hold that each individual has a human right to socioeconomic goods because the duty-bearers are not sufficiently determined. Even though this objection has been defended in the literature from many counter-arguments, at-tacks against the claimability objection based on non-conventional conceptions of human rights remain unexplored. In this paper, I aim to fill this significant gap in the philosophical literature. I defend the claimability objection from arguments that aim to undermine such an objection on the basis of non-conventional conceptions of human rights. By doing so, I reinforce the defence of the claimability objection.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)173-192
Number of pages20
Issue number2
StatePublished - 21 Dec 2022
Externally publishedYes


  • Claimability objection
  • O’Neill
  • global justice
  • human right to socioeconomic goods
  • human rights


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