States claim and mutually recognize the right to exclude potential immigrants at their own discretion. From a liberal perspective, the justification for this exclusion is not obvious. Wellman argues that this right is justified on the ground of freedom of association: Just as a club can discriminate in its associative terms, so can the State. This article criticizes this argument and argues that the underlying analogy is wrong. On the one hand, States are not like clubs, and clubs are not like states. The first ones follow the logic of the private law, the second ones the logic of the public law. To argue in favor of such an analogy leads to implausible consequences. On the other hand, if freedom of association is the basis of the argument, it does not follow the right of states to exclude potential immigrants, but the right of world citizens to associate across national borders.
|Translated title of the contribution||Questioning the relationship between freedom of association and the right to exclude immigrants: Three arguments against Ch.H. Wellman|
|Number of pages||24|
|State||Published - Nov 2020|