Attendance manipulation and efficiency in Chile's school voucher system

Eduardo Fajnzylber, Bernardo Lara

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review


To improve the quality of education, one can either directly reward performance or introduce school choice, private provision, and demand subsidies. The Chilean voucher scheme combines both approaches: an attendance-related subsidy favors school choice and creates incentives for schools to promote attendance throughout the year. With imperfect monitoring, however, institutions may respond by manipulating performance indicators. By analyzing audit data, we find evidence that a large fraction of Chilean schools – including public schools – over-report attendance, with a higher prevalence among for-profit and under-achieving institutions. Expenditure data suggest that manipulation among for-profit schools seems to follow rent extraction purposes rather than educational goals.

Original languageEnglish
Article number102426
JournalEconomics of Education Review
StatePublished - Aug 2023
Externally publishedYes


  • Attendance
  • Incentives
  • Manipulation
  • School choice
  • Vouchers


Dive into the research topics of 'Attendance manipulation and efficiency in Chile's school voucher system'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this