Generally, concepts are treated as individual-level phenomena. Here, we develop an ABM that treats concepts as group-level phenomena. We make simple assumptions: (1) Different versions exist of one similar conceptualization; (2) When we infer that our view agrees with someone else's view, we are subject to true agreement (i.e., we really share the concept), but also to illusory agreement (i.e., we do not really share the concept); (3) Regardless whether agreement is true or illusory, it strengthens a concept's salience in individual minds, and increases the probability of seeking future interactions with that person or source of information. When agents in teract using these rules, our ABM shows that three conditions exist: (a) All versions of the same conceptualization strengthen their salience; (b) Some versions strengthen while others weaken their salience; (c) All versions weaken their salience. The same results are corroborated by developing probability models (conditional and Markov chain). Sensitivity analyses to various parameters, allow the derivation of intuitively correct predictions that support our model's face validity. We believe the ABM and related mathematical models may explain the spread or demise of conceptualizations in social groups, and the emergence of polarized social views, all important issues to sociology and psychology.